

## Message Text

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POLITICAL ANALYSIS: THE SOVIET 60TH ANNIVERSARY--UTOPIA IS  
STILL A LONG WAY OFF

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. DESPITE THE KREMLIN'S MAMMOTH EFFORTS  
TO GLORIFY THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SIX DECADES OF SOCIALISM,  
ITS ORCHESTRATION OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION'S 60TH ANNIVER-  
  
SARY SOMEHOW FAILED TO GENERATE MUCH EUPHORIA, LET ALONE  
BOLSHEVIK ENTHUSIASM, IN THE SOVIET POPULATION. IN FACT,  
THE REGIME FELT COMPELLED TO REMIND THE CITIZENRY THAT

WHILE THE REVOLUTION HAS COME A LONG WAY, THE PATH AHEAD IS ALSO LONG AND ARDUOUS--COMMUNIST UTOPIA IS NOT YET ON THE HORIZON. BREZHNEV'S KEYNOTE SPEECH AT THE OPENING KREMLIN CEREMONIES, NOVEMBER 2, SET A LACKLUSTER, EVEN RATHER SOMBER TONE FOR THE ENTIRE EVENT: BY SOVIET STANDARDS, HE GAVE A RELATIVELY NON-POLEMICAL, REASONED, STATESMANLIKE SURVEY OF SOCIALIST ACCOMPLISHMENTS, BUT HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE COUNTRY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REST ON ANY PAST LAURELS.

2. THE MESSAGE INTENDED FOR THE AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN IS THAT THE PARTY, WITH BREZHNEV FIRMLY IN CHARGE, IS LEADING THE COUNTRY COMPETENTLY; THAT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MAY BE GENERALLY SATISFACTORY, BUT MORE EFFORT WILL BE REQUIRED AT ALL LEVELS TO ADVANCE FROM THE CURRENT ERA OF "DEVELOPED SOCIALISM" TO COMMUNISM. FOR FOREIGN AUDIENCES, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE SOME 100 FOREIGN DELEGATIONS PRESENT, THE MESSAGE WAS THAT THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION HAD PLACED RUSSIA IN THE VANGUARD OF WORLD HISTORY AND THAT THE CPSU INTENDED, REGARDLESS OF ANY CHALLENGES AHEAD EITHER FROM THE CAPITALIST WORLD OR FROM WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, TO GUARD THAT HARD-WON POSITION. REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR, HOWEVER, WAS DEFINITELY TONED  
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DOWN IN FAVOR OF TOUTING MATERIAL ADVANCES AT HOME AND BREZHNEV'S PEACE PROGRAM ABROAD.

3. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE OCCASION INCLUDED:

(A)--BREZHNEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF A GRAIN HARVEST FIGURE WELL BELOW PLANNED TARGETS, EPITOMIZING THE SOBERING PROBLEMS THE COUNTRY FACES IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE;

(B)--BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, THUS REVERSING EARLIER SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, AND HIS EXPRESSION FOR THE FIRST TIME OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE EFFORTS FOR THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT;

(C)--A MILITARY PARADE FEATURING TWICE AS MANY ARMORED VEHICLES AS LAST YEAR BUT DOWNPLAYING STRATEGIC WEAPONRY;

(D)--AN AMNESTY THAT DELIBERATELY AVOIDED CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL DISSIDENTS;

(E)--THE MUZZLING OF EUROCOMMUNIST ACTIVIST CARRILLO WHILE OTHER EUROCOMMUNISTS SPOKE PUBLICLY, DEMONSTRATING ONCE

AGAIN SOVIET AMBIVALENCE ABOUT TACTICS FOR HANDLING DISSIDENCE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT;

(F)--THE INEFFECTUAL EFFORTS BY SUSLOV AND PONOMAREV TO PAPER OVER DIFFERENCES AMONG THE PARTIES WHILE TRYING TO REASSERT THE CPSU'S GUIDING ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT. END SUMMARY.

4. BEGIN TEXT. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH: FOREIGN POLICY:

5. BREZHNEV'S FOREIGN POLICY TOUR D'HORIZON LARGELY REHEARSED STANDARD PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE THEMES, LAST COM-  
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PREHENSIVELY REVIEWED BY HIM AT TULA IN JANUARY, BUT HE INTERJECTED THIS TIME SOME NOTEWORTHY VARIATIONS IN EMPHASIS AND SEVERAL INNOVATIVE GESTURES.

6. ON US SOVIET RELATIONS, BREZHNEV STRESSED ONCE AGAIN THAT THE MAIN SOVIET DESIDERATUM IS ADHERENCE TO THE EQUALITY/EQUAL SECURITY FORMULA. HE STATED EVEN MORE EMPHATICALLY THAN BEFORE THAT THE USSR DOES NOT AND WILL NOT SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY BUT ALSO WILL UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE EVER JEOPARDIZE THE MILITARY EQUALITY IT HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED. (HE DESCRIBED SOVIET DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AS "NEVER BEFORE" HAVING BEEN "SO SOUND AND DEPENDABLE.")

7. NEVERTHELESS, HE EMPHASIZED THE USSR'S INTEREST IN SCALING DOWN THE ARMS RACE, SPECIFICALLY PROPOSING:

(A)--IN AN ESSENTIALLY PROPAGANDISTIC GESTURE, CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE NEUTRON BOMB, AN OFFER HE TERMED "RADICAL" IN WHAT MAY WELL HAVE BEEN A SNIDE RIPOSTE TO THE (ALSO CALLED "RADICAL") US PACKAGE PROPOSED TO MOSCOW LAST MARCH;

(B)--A MORATORIUM ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. THIS PROPOSAL, IN CONTRAST, MARKS A SHARP REVERSAL OF PAST SOVIET NEGOTIATING EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE PEACEFUL-USE DETONATIONS UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. BREZHNEV APPARENTLY WANTS A CTB AGREEMENT AND, MOREOVER, HOPES TO APPEAR IN PUBLIC AS THE MAN WHO CUT THE GORDIAN KNOT.

(THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA THE SAME DAY THEREUPON PROPOSED A THREE-YEAR MORATORIUM ON PNE'S TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH A THREE-YEAR BAN ON WEAPONS TESTS, WITH A STIPULATION THAT  
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THE PARTIES MEANWHILE NEGOTIATE ON PROCEDURES TO PERMIT PNE'S IN THE FUTURE.)

8. IN ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE, THIS TIME WITH

RESPECT TO THE THIRD WORLD, BREZHNEV FOR THE FIRST TIME INDICATED A SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT. HE SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR COLLECTIVE COOPERATION TO COPE WITH THIS PRESSING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM. HERETOFORE, THE SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS ARGUED THAT THE IMPERIALIST POWERS ALONE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BACKWARDNESS OF THE THIRD WORLD AND FOR REMEDYING IT. SINCE FRG CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND OTHER EUROPEAN LEADERS HAVE REPEATEDLY APPROACHED THE SOVIETS ON THIS SUBJECT, BREZHNEV'S RESPONSE MAY THUS BE DIRECTED AS MUCH TOWARD A EUROPEAN AUDIENCE AS TOWARD WASHINGTON'S INTEREST IN THE NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM.

9. IN ANY EVENT, THE ONLY NON-COMMUNIST AREA BREZHNEV TOUCHED ON OUTSIDE THE US WAS EUROPE, WHERE HE SAW ONLY PROGRESS AND HOPEFUL INDICATORS. THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE WAS TOTALLY IGNORED, HOWEVER, AS WERE THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, AND JAPAN.

10. BREZHNEV DID NOT EXPLICITLY MENTION EUROCOMMUNISM, BUT HIS LENGTHY IDEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ADVANCES OF SOCIALISM WAS OBVIOUSLY DRAFTED WITH AN EYE TO THAT PROBLEM. HIGHLIGHTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE AS A REVOLUTIONARY MODEL, HE REASSERTED THE SO-CALLED ZARODOV LINE BY BLUNTLY REMINDING EVERYONE THAT THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN ANY REVOLUTION REMAINS POWER AND ITS RETENTION. BUT HIS TENOR THROUGHOUT WAS OSTENSIBLY PATERNALISTIC, AS IF HELPFULLY GUIDING RATHER THAN CHIDING THE ERRANT. IN THAT VEIN, HE BLAMED THE HERESIES OF THE EURO-COMMUNISTS ON IMPERIALIST SUBVERSION EFFORTS, ESPECIALLY THE "FALSEHOOD" THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO DICTATE THE PATH OF OTHER PARTIES.  
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11. EASTERN EUROPE WAS AGAIN TREATED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SOVIET DOMESTIC AND/OR SOCIALIST CONSIDERATIONS, REINFORCING A TENDENCY EVIDENT SINCE THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS. ACCORDING TO BREZHNEV, INTEGRATION IN EASTERN EUROPE IS PROGRESSING APACE.

12. IT WAS WITHIN THIS SAME SOCIALISM CONTEXT THAT BREZHNEV REFERRED BRIEFLY TO SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, AS USUAL DEPICTING PEKING AS ERRING FROM A TRUE MARXIST-LENINIST COURSE TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. HIS MAIN TARGET, HOWEVER, WAS THOSE "LEADERS IN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES" WHO ALLEGEDLY SPECULATE ON SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES LASTING AND GROWING MORE ACUTE. HE WARNED THEM THAT SUCH POLICIES ARE "SHORTSIGHTED" AND COULD LEAD TO MISCALCULATION. BUT ANY

SPECULATION ON THE FUTURE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS HE DISMISSED AS POINTLESS, MERELY NOTING THAT STANDING SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS STILL HOLD GOOD.

13. DOMESTIC ASPECTS:

14. BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ABOUT THE DOMESTIC SCENE WERE CALCULATED TO CONVEY THE IMAGE OF CALM AND SELF-ASSURED LEADERSHIP. HE SAID NOTHING ABOUT AN UPCOMING AMNESTY (ANNOUNCED NOVEMBER 4) FOR NON-POLITICAL PRISONERS SIMILAR TO THE ONE THAT MARKED THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY, NOR WAS THE SENSITIVE SUBJECT OF DISSIDENCE MENTIONED. INDEED, ALL TOUCHY DOMESTIC ISSUES WERE AVOIDED, ALTHOUGH BREZHNEV DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT "MANY PROBLEMS" STILL EXISTED AT HOME. HE EVEN TREATED THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM AS ESSENTIALLY SOLVED, IN EFFECT IGNORING RECENT MANIFESTATIONS OF THAT PERENNIAL PROBLEM IN THE BALTIC STATES AND GEORGIA. AND AS USUAL, CONFIDENTIAL

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HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VIRTUES OF "COORDINATION, EFFICIENCY AND DISCIPLINE," QUALITIES FREQUENTLY ABSENT IN SOVIET LIFE.

15. BREZHNEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE GRAIN HARVEST WILL REACH ONLY 194 MILLION TONS THIS YEAR WAS, HOWEVER, PROBABLY SOMETHING OF A SHOCK TO HIS LISTENERS SINCE THE FIGURE IS SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THE PLANNED TARGET OF 215 MILLION TONS. WHILE THE EXPECTED HARVEST IS RESPECTABLE IN COMPARISON WITH THE AVERAGE OUTPUT OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE USSR WILL BE BUYING SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS IN THE WORLD GRAIN MARKETS AGAIN THIS YEAR. BREZHNEV ALSO SAID THAT PLANNED LARGE INVESTMENTS IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT WILL CONTINUE; THIS NOT ONLY MEANS A CONTINUATION OF HIS FARM PROGRAM BUT INDICATES NO EASING OF STRAIN ON ALLOCATION DECISIONS CONCERNING OTHER SECTORS.

16. BREZHNEV'S PUBLIC IMAGE REMAINED THAT OF THE UNIVERSALLY ADULATED LEADER. A MUSICAL-POETIC COMPOSITION PERFORMED AT THE KREMLIN PALACE OF CONGRESSES ON NOVEMBER 2 FEATURED SCENES FROM HIS LIFE, AND THE NOVEMBER 4 OFFICIAL "GREETINGS TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE" SALUTED HIM AS THE "TRUE CONTINUATOR OF THE GREAT LENINIST CAUSE AND OUTSTANDING FIGHTER FOR PEACE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS" WHO STOOD "AT THE HEAD" OF THE POLITBURO. THERE WERE SOME HINTS, HOWEVER, THAT BREZHNEV MAY BE PAST THE PEAK OF HIS POWER. HIS UTTERANCES AT THE TRADITIONAL NOVEMBER 7 RECEPTION IN THE KREMLIN WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, OFFICIALLY REPORTED TO HAVE DRAWN ONLY "PROLONGED APPLAUSE," AS IN 1976; HE RATED "STORMY, PROLONGED APPLAUSE" IN 1972, 1973, AND 1975.

THOUGH HE SEEMED FIT FOR A MAN OF HIS YEARS, BREZHNEV APPEARED TO HAVE SUFFERED A MENTAL LAPSE IN THE DELIVERY OF HIS NOVEMBER 2 REPORT, INADVERTENTLY OMITTING SEVERAL PASSAGES RELATED TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

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17. A CLUE TO POWER RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE TOP ECHELONS WAS FURTHER OFFERED BY THE LINE-UP ON LENIN'S TOMB AT THE NOVEMBER 7 PARADE. PARTY SECRETARY FOR AGRICULTURE AND BREZHNEV COLLABORATOR KULAKOV WAS OUTRANKED BY FIRST DEPUTY PREMIER MAZUROV, AN INDEPENDENT, AND BY OLD BOLSHEVIK PELSHE, CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE, AS WELL AS BY MOSCOW PARTY BOSS GRISHIN. PARTY SECRETARY FOR "IDEOLOGY" SUSLOV DID NOT APPEAR IN PRAVDA'S PICTURE OF THE REVIEWING STAND, AND PRESS AGENCY REPORTS OF HIS PRESENCE THERE CANNOT BE CONFIRMED. HE DID, HOWEVER, GIVE A SPEECH A FEW DAYS LATER, BUT IT WAS AN ABBREVIATED ONE BY SOVIET STANDARDS.

18. MILITARY ASPECTS:

19. THE NOVEMBER 7 MILITARY PARADE INCLUDED 336 MECHANIZED VEHICLES--MORE THAN TWICE AS MANY AS LAST YEAR. TRACKED VEHICLES APPEARED IN THE PARADE FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1974, A RATHER TANGIBLE SIGN OF DEFERENCE TO THE MILITARY, GIVEN PAST DAMAGE TO THE RED SQUARE PAVEMENT BY SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS. HOWEVER, STRATEGIC WEAPONS THAT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY AROUSE WESTERN REACTIONS DETRIMENTAL TO SALT WERE CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT.

20. STAR OF THE SHOW WAS THE T-72 TANK, MAKING ITS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE IN MOSCOW. THE DISPLAY OF 46 OF THESE NEWEST TANKS IN THE SOVIET ARMY'S INVENTORY MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO UNDERScore THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF THE TANK IN LAND WARFARE, AN ISSUE REAFFIRMED PUBLICLY AT THE ANNUAL SOVIET TANK TROOP HOLIDAY EACH YEAR FOR THE PAST THREE.

21. DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV'S BRIEF SPEECH AT THE PARADE  
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WAS CAST IN GENERALLY MODERATE TERMS, AS WERE HIS REMARKS LAST YEAR. IF ANYTHING, HE WAS SLIGHTLY MORE POSITIVE THAN LAST YEAR IN NOTING THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE, EVEN THOUGH "HOSTILE PROPAGANDA" WAS STILL BEING CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES "IN THE SPIRIT OF THE COLD WAR." HE DID, HOWEVER, USE SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL LANGUAGE WITH RESPECT TO THE WARSAW PACT, IMPLYING AN EVEN GREATER INTEGRATIVE EMPHASIS THAN MOSCOW NORMALLY GIVES THAT BODY--"IN A SINGLE COMBAT FORMATION THE ARMIES OF THE FRATERNAL COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE ALWAYS

READY TO DEFEND THE GAINS OF SOCIALISM AND WORTHILY TO CARRY OUT THEIR PATRIOTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DUTY."

22. FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION:

23. SUSLOV'S AND PONOMAREV'S SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS TO RALLY THE LOWER-RANKING REPRESENTATIVES OF SOME 70 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES AT A MOSCOW "SCIENTIFIC-THEORETICAL" CONFERENCE ON NOVEMBER 10 WERE, LIKE BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, MARKED BY PROSAIC PRAISE OF SOCIALISM'S ACHIEVEMENTS. BOTH APPARENTLY STUCK TO STEREOTYPED ARGUMENTATION. SUSLOV, LIKE BREZHNEV, AVOIDED DIRECT MENTION OF EUROCOMMUNISM WHILE TAKING INDIRECT SWIPES AT IT, ENDING HIS DISCOURSE WITH A PLAINTIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER A "SINGLE INTERNATIONAL CENTER" AND THAT IN CONDITIONS WHEREIN PARTIES "ACT INDEPENDENTLY, WITHOUT ALLOWING INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S AFFAIRS," THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN UNITY HAS BECOME EVEN MORE PARAMOUNT. PONOMAREV'S MORE OPEN CASTIGATION OF THOSE WHO "SEEK TO CONVERT DIFFERENCES INTO DISAGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS INTO A SPLIT" LIKEWISE FAILED TO COME TO GRIPS WITH ANY OF THE REAL ISSUES DIVIDING THE CPSU AND THE EUROPEAN PARTIES. BOTH SUSLOV AND PONOMAREV SPOKE OF THE NECESSITY FOR CONTINUING DETENTE BUT WITHOUT ANY LESSENING OF THE "CLASS WAR." THEY ALSO CONFIDENTIAL

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ATTACKED HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY AS PART OF A CONCERTED ANTI-SOVIET, ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN.

24. DISCORD BETWEEN THE CPSU AND THE EUROCOMMUNISTS WAS NONETHELESS EVIDENT THROUGHOUT THE CELEBRATIONS. FRENCH CP LEADER MARCHAIS DID NOT ACCOMPANY THE FRENCH DELEGATION TO MOSCOW. SPANISH CP LEADER CARRILLO CAME BUT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO SPEAK AT THE MAJOR GALA. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS DISCLAIMED ANY INTENT TO SILENCE HIM, THEY CERTAINLY DID NOTHING TO FACILITATE CARRILLO'S ACTIVITIES WHILE HE WAS IN THE SOVIET UNION. ITALIAN CP LEADER BERLINGUER ONCE AGAIN PUBLICLY REASSERTED ITALIAN INDEPENDENCE, ALBEIT IN LOW-KEY FASHION, AND SEVERAL OTHER EUROPEAN PARTY LEADERS DID LIKEWISE. MOSCOW HAD TO RELY ON PORTUGAL'S CUNHAL AND THE FRG'S MIES FOR PROPER EXTOLLING OF THE SOVIET EXAMPLE.

25. THERE WAS ALSO CONSIDERABLE VARIATION AMONG THE SPEECHES BY THE EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS AT THE MOSCOW FESTIVITIES. THE YUGOSLAVS AND ROMANIANS CAREFULLY ASSERTED A CERTAIN DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE. AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM, THE BULGARIANS, CZECHOSLOVAKS, AND POLES ALL EULOGIZED THE SOVIET EXAMPLE AND ENDORSED SOVIET POSITIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. THE EAST GERMANS

AND HUNGARIANS HELD TO THE MIDDLE GROUND, PRAISING SOVIET ACHIEVEMENTS WHILE AVOIDING THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES.

26. THE CHINESE, WHO HAVE NOT HAD PARTY TIES WITH MOSCOW

FOR OVER A DECADE, HANDLED THE EVENT IN A MIXED FASHION.  
IN MOSCOW, BREZHNEV'S REMARKS ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS  
WERE DEEMED SUFFICIENTLY HOSTILE TO PROMPT THE NEW CHINESE  
AMBASSADOR'S FIRST WALKOUT. AND PEKING'S ANNIVERSARY  
MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS AND ACCOMPANYING COMMEMORATIVE  
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EDITORIALS WERE HARDLY CONCILIATORY. THE FORMER CALLED  
UPON THE USSR TO IMPLEMENT AN ALLEGED 1969 UNDERSTANDING  
ABOUT SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS ON THE BORDER, AND THE  
LATTER BERATED THE KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV LEADERSHIPS FOR  
THEIR BETRAYAL OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. ON OCTOBER 31,  
MOREOVER, CHINA AUTHORITATIVELY REITERATED ITS COMMITMENT  
TO MAO'S FOREIGN POLICY LINE, A LINE THAT JUSTIFIES MAKING  
COMMON CAUSE WITH PRACTICALLY ANYONE WILLING TO OPPOSE THE  
USSR. IN PEKING, HOWEVER, THE CHINESE UPGRADED THE LEVEL  
OF THEIR REPRESENTATION AT THE VARIOUS LOCAL SOVIET ANNI-  
VERSARY FESTIVITIES AND HUANG HUA BECAME THE FIRST CHINESE  
FOREIGN MINISTER TO ATTEND THE ANNIVERSARY RECEPTION AT  
THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PEKING SINCE 1966. END TEXT. VANCE

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